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I. INTRODUCTION 
A. A Constitutional Referendum 
Every Presidential election is, in effect, a national referendum on the 
meaning of the Constitution. The people of the United States are largely 
united in their dedication to the general constitutional principles of liberty, 
equality, fundamental fairness, democracy, and limited government. We 
are, however, divided as to the proper application of those principles to 
our laws and public institutions. Elections for the Presidency and (to a 
much lesser degree) the Senate of the United States afford each citizen the 
opportunity to vote on how the Constitution should be interpreted. 
As a result of presidential elections, Republican presidents 
nominated all ten of the Justices appointed to the United States Supreme 
Court between 1969 and 1991.1 As a result, Republicans have controlled 
the Supreme Court since 1970.2 For three years during this period (1991 
to 1994), eight of the Justices on the Supreme Court were Republican 
appointees.3 The last forty-six years may be accurately described as the 
era of the modern Republican Supreme Court. During this period the right 
to gender equality was recognized4 and the right to marriage equality was 
* B.A. Yale University, 1972; J.D. Cornell Law School, 1977; Distinguished Professor Emeritus,
University of Akron School of Law. 
1. See Supreme Court of the United States, Members of the Supreme Court of the United 
States, https://www.supremecourt.gov/about/members_text.aspx (last accessed October 19, 2016) 
(listing justices by date of judicial oath). 
2. See WebLineNews, Supreme Court Justice Charts, History of Appointments Has Favored 
Republicans (February 17, 2016) (featuring chart of Supreme Court Justices, members over time from 
1857 to 2015), at  http://www.weblinenews.com/supreme-court-justice-charts/ (last accessed October 
19, 2016). 
3. Id.
4. See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (striking down state law that discriminated on 
the basis of gender as a violation of Equal Protection). 
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realized.5 However, also during this period many Republican Justices 
staunchly opposed gender equality, and far more remains to be 
accomplished. 
Since Justice Scalia’s death, the Supreme Court has been deadlocked 
on a number of Constitutional questions. Accordingly, his replacement on 
the Supreme Court, dictated by the 2016 presidential election, will have a 
dramatic effect on the interpretation of the Constitution, including a 
number of issues relating to gender equality. 
President Barack Obama nominated U.S. Court of Appeals Judge 
Merrick Garland to replace Justice Scalia on the Court, but Senate 
Republicans, fearing loss of control of the Court for perhaps both 
political6 and economic reasons,7  refused to consider Judge Garland’s 
5. See United States v. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675, 2696 (2013) (striking down the federal
Defense of Marriage Act); See also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S.Ct. 2584, 2607 (2015) (striking down 
state laws banning same-sex marriage). 
6. Loss of control of the Supreme Court would be catastrophic for the political aspirations of
the Republican Party. In recent years the Supreme Court has issued a number of decisions on election 
law aiding the Republican Party, either striking down legal protections for voters or upholding 
discriminatory laws that have tilted the scales towards Republican candidates for office. See e.g. 
Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S. Ct. 2612 (2013) (striking down preclearance provision of Voting 
Rights Act); Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310 (2010) (striking down prohibition on corporate 
expenditures for political candidates); Crawford v. Marion County Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2010) 
(upholding restrictive voter identification law); League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 
548 U.S. 999 (2003) (upholding political gerrymandering plan for Texas congressional districts). All 
of these decisions would likely be overruled by a Democratic majority on the Supreme Court. 
Moreover, in 2016 the Court split 4-4 in a case considering the constitutionality of “fair share fees” 
for public unions. Friedrichs v. California Teachers Ass’n, 135 S.Ct. 2933 (2016) (summarily 
affirming the decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upholding the constitutionality of fair 
share fees for public unions). A conservative Supreme Court would tip the balance on that issue, 
making it  impossible for public employees to bargain collectively, thereby destroying one of the most 
powerful constituencies of the Democratic Party. 
7. A lot of money is also riding on control of the Supreme Court, in terms of the interpretation 
of federal banking, antitrust, and environmental laws, as well as laws governing arbitration claims, 
class action suits, and punitive damage awards. For example, in one single pro-business decision, the 
Supreme Court reduced a punitive damages award against Exxon for the Exxon Valdez disaster from 
$2.5 billion to $507 million – an amount that exceeds the amount of money spent by the candidates 
in a presidential election. Exxon Shipping Co. v. Baker, 554 U.S. 471 (2003). See also James B. 
Stewart, Republicans Have a Stake in Making a Deal on a Supreme Court Justice, NEW YORK TIMES 
(March 3, 2016), at http://www.nytimes.com/2016/03/04/business/a-way-to-a-deal-on-a-supreme-
court-nomination.html. Stewart quotes Professor Lee Epstein: 
And when it  comes to business and economic issues, what’s at stake is nearly every pro-
business Supreme Court ruling since the Reagan era and the emergence of a reliable 5-to-
4 pro-business majority on the court. ‘To see the number of cases that could change with 
this appointee is stunning,’ since so many of the most important cases were decided by 5-
to-4 votes, said Lee Epstein, who teaches constitutional law and legal institutions at 
Washington University in St. Louis. 
See generally Victora Bassetti, Behind the Merrick Garland Blockade, Brennan Center for Justice 
(May 5, 2016), https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/behind-merrick-garland-blockade. Bassetti 
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candidacy or to even hold hearings on his nomination. Newly-elected 
President Donald Trump has nominated U.S. Court of Appeals Judge Neil 
Gorsuch to fill Scalia’s position on the Court. 
B. The Swing Justice and the Author of the Majority Opinion 
Since 2006, the “swing justice” on the Supreme Court has been 
Justice Anthony Kennedy.8 If a conservative justice like Judge Gorsuch 
is appointed to replace Justice Scalia, Justice Kennedy will remain the 
swing justice. If a liberal justice is somehow appointed to that vacancy, 
the new swing justice will be Justice Stephen Breyer, the most 
conservative member of the liberal wing of the Court.9 If President Trump 
is given the opportunity to fill more than one vacancy on the Supreme 
Court, the balance will tip even further; the swing justice might be Chief 
Justice Roberts for the conservatives10 or Justice Elena Kagan for the 
liberals.11 
Even in cases where changing the ideological balance of the Supreme 
Court would have no effect on the outcome of a case, it could have a 
dramatic effect on the Court’s reasoning, because it might change which 
justice would author the majority opinion.12 For example, in the marriage 
equality cases, if the vote had been 6-3 instead of 5-4, the author of the 
opinion might have been Ruth Bader Ginsburg instead of Anthony 
describes Republican efforts to create a “business friendly” court. See also Lee Epstein, William M. 
Landes, and Richard A. Posner, How Business Fares in the Supreme Court, 97 MINN. L.REV.1431 
(2013), (also available online in University of Chicago Law School, Chicago Unbound (2013) 
http://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=5011&context=journal_articles). 
In a painstakingly careful data-driven analysis, the authors determined that the five Republican 
justices serving on the Court at the time of Justice Scalia’s death all ranked among the ten most-
business friendly judges to have served on the Court since 1946, and that all five of the present justices 
appointed by Republican Presidents were more friendly to business than the existing Democratic 
justices. Id. at 1472. 
8. See Andrew D. Martin and Kevin M. Quinn, Dynamic Ideal Point Estimation via Markov
Chain Monte Carlo for the U.S. Supreme Court, 1953-1999 (2014) 
http://mqscores.berkeley.edu/measures.php (2014 Court Data Files, Martin Quinn Scores identifying 
Justice Kennedy as the swing justice from the time of Justice O’Connor’s retirement through 2014); 
2014 Justice Data Files, Id. (showing Justice Kennedy with a posterior mean location of 0.15, the 
median score among the justices for 2014).  
9. See Id. (showing Justice Breyer with a posterior mean location of -1.729 for 2014, the
“highest” (that is, most conservative) of the four liberal justices). 
10. Id. (showing Chief Justice Roberts with a posterior mean location of 0.869, the “lowest”
(that is, most liberal) of the four conservative justices other than Justice Kennedy). 
11. Id. (showing Justice Kagan with a posterior mean location of -1.913 for 2014, next highest 
score among the liberal justices). 
12. See Washington University Law, The Supreme Court Writing Database: The Opinion-
Writing Process, http://supremecourtopinions.wustl.edu/ (last accessed October 3, 2016) (describing 
how the author of a Supreme Court opinion is selected).  
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Kennedy, and the Court might have recognized sexual orientation as a 
suspect classification and declared that laws that intentionally 
disadvantage this group are subject to heightened scrutiny. 
C. The Constitutional Provisions Affected 
The most fundamental constitutional bulwark protecting gender 
equality is the Equal Protection Clause, and there are many Supreme 
Court decisions on gender discrimination from this Republican era of 
1970 forward that are ripe for overruling. However, the constitutional law 
of gender equality is not limited to questions involving the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Constitution. Many other provisions of the 
Constitution also play a critical role in the determination of gender 
equality, including the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, 
the right to Freedom of Expression under the First Amendment; the Right 
to Privacy, which is one aspect of the right to “liberty” under the Due 
Process Clause of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments; Congress’ 
power to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause, the General 
Welfare Clause, and the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment; the State Action doctrine; and the unenumerated principle 
of “state sovereignty”, which is derived from the 11th Amendment. 
Furthermore, the Supreme Court is also divided on questions of statutory 
interpretation that relate to gender equality. 
This paper discusses the impact that Justice Scalia’s replacement will 
have on these aspects of constitutional law and statutory interpretation that 
relate to gender equality. 
II. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. Standard of Review 
The Supreme Court has recognized Equal Protection claims based on 
gender discrimination for forty-five years, but the standard of review 
employed by the Court during that period to evaluate such claims has 
wavered from rational basis to strict scrutiny to intermediate scrutiny to a 
strong form of intermediate scrutiny. At first, in Reed v. Reed the Court 
employed a low level of review, the rational basis test.13 Three years later 
in Frontiero v. Richardson a plurality of the Court adopted strict scrutiny 
13. See Reed, 404 U.S. at 761 (stating that the issue in the case was “whether a difference in
the sex of competing applicants for letters of administration bears a rational relationship to a state 
objective that is sought to be advanced” by the Idaho statute).   
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as the proper standard of review.14 In 1976 in Craig v. Boren the Court 
applied an “intermediate scrutiny” standard.15 In 1996, in what remains 
the most significant gender discrimination case under the Equal Protection 
Clause, the Court once again strengthened the applicable standard. 
Writing for the majority in United States v. Virginia, Justice Ruth Bader 
Ginsburg held that to pass constitutional muster a law discriminating on 
the basis of gender must be supported by an “exceedingly persuasive 
justification.”16 While Justice Kennedy joined that opinion, Justices 
Scalia and Thomas dissented,17 and Chief Justice Rehnquist concurred in 
the judgment only, writing separately to express his opposition to the 
“exceedingly persuasive justification” standard.18 Justice Ginsburg most 
recently invoked this standard in her dissenting opinion in Coleman v. 
Court of Appeals of Maryland, and was joined by the other three liberal 
members of the Court.19 The addition of a liberal justice to the Court 
would install a majority who support the “exceedingly persuasive 
justification” standard for laws that discriminate on the basis of gender, 
while the addition of two more conservative members of the Court would 
probably spell its demise. 
B. Intent to Discriminate 
One of the great, yet almost invisible, constitutional principles is the 
doctrine of “governmental intent.”20 Governmental intent is a theme that 
14. See Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 682 (1973) (stating, “classifications based upon 
sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, and national origin, are inherently suspect and must 
therefore be subjected to close judicial scrutiny” (footnotes omitted)).  
15. See Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976) (stating, “classifications by gender must
serve important governmental objectives and must be substantially related to achievement of those 
objectives”). 
16. See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 531 (1996) (Ginsburg, J.) (ordering that
women be admitted to the Virginia Military Institute on the same basis as men, and stating, “Parties 
who seek to defend gender-based government action must demonstrate an exceedingly persuasive 
justification for that action.”). 
17. See id. at 566 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking a “tradition” approach to interpreting the
Equal Protection Clause). Justice Scalia commenced his opinion by equating coeducation with the 
closure: “Today the Court shuts down an institution that has served the people of the Commonwealth 
of Virginia with pride and distinction for over a century and a half.” 
18. See id. at 559 (Rehnquist, C.J., concurring in the judgment) (“While terms like “important
governmental objective” and “substantially related” are hardly models of precision, they have more 
content and specificity than does the phrase “exceedingly persuasive justification.”).  
19. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 1348 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting) (applying the “exceedingly persuasive justification” standard from United States v. 
Virginia). 
20. See generally Stephen E. Gottlieb, MORALITY IMPOSED: THE REHNQUIST COURT AND 
LIBERTY IN AMERICA 54 (2000) (“The role of intent in law may seem quite arcane but, in fact, it  has 
had a shattering effect on large areas of law and once again it reflects the substitution of a conservative 
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pervades Constitutional Law. In several other areas of Constitutional Law 
the government’s intent determines the standard of review that the law is 
subject to. For example, in freedom of expression cases, the Supreme 
Court has stated that “The government’s purpose is the controlling 
consideration”21 in determining whether the law is content neutral, 
content based, or viewpoint based.22 
In Equal Protection cases, the doctrine of governmental intent is 
known as the requirement of “purposeful discrimination,” and it has an 
even greater significance than in other areas of constitutional law. No 
matter how great of a disproportionate impact that a law has upon a 
particular group, if the law was not adopted for the purpose of having that 
effect upon that particular group, then the members of that group have no 
valid claim of discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause against 
that law.23 
The most egregious example illustrating the principle of 
discriminatory intent in gender equality cases is Geduldig v. Aiello.24 In 
that 1974 case, the Supreme Court considered the constitutionality of a 
California state disability insurance program that did not cover disabilities 
resulting from complications of pregnancy.25 The Court found that the law 
did not discriminate between women and men, but rather it discriminated 
between “pregnant women and nonpregnant persons.”26 Refusing to treat 
this as a case of gender discrimination,27 the Court upheld the law on the 
ground that it would save money, which is of course a legitimate 
governmental purpose.28 Justice Ginsburg has eloquently argued that it is 
moral view for a liberal / utilitarian view.”). 
21. Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989).
22. See id. (finding that a municipal sound amplification guideline was content neutral).
23. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (“our cases have not embraced 
the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard to whether it  reflects a racially 
discriminatory purpose, is unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate impact.”). 
See also Gottlieb, supra note 20, at 57 (“In the speech and racial areas, . . . the conservatives have 
used the intent standard to substitute conservative notions of morality for an instrumental standard, 
which would have judged actions by their often predicable result .”).  
24. Geduldig v. Aiello, 417 U.S. 484, 497 (1974) (upholding state disability insurance program 
excluding coverage for disability resulting from normal pregnancy). 
25. See id. at 489 (quoting the statutory provision excluding coverage for “any injury or illness 
caused by or arising in connection with pregnancy up to the termination of such pregnancy and for a 
period of 28 days thereafter.”). 
26. Id. at 496 n. 20.
27. See id. The Court stated:
[T]his case is a far cry from cases like Reed v. Reed and Frontiero v. Richardson, involving 
discrimination based on gender as such. The California insurance program does not 
exclude anyone form benefit eligibility because of gender but merely removes one a 
physical condition – pregnancy – from the list  of compensable disabilit ies. 
28. See id. at 498 (stating, “The State has a legitimate interest in maintaining the self-
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time for the Court to overrule Aiello and to recognize that under the 
Constitution, discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is discrimination 
on the basis of gender.29 
Another extreme case decided during the Republican era involving 
the application of the requirement of discriminatory intent is Personnel 
Administrator v. Feeney. 30 In that case, the Court ruled that a state law 
granting an employment preference to veterans did not purposefully 
discriminate against women, even though 98% of the veterans at time 
were men, and the law had the effect of virtually locking women out of 
eligibility for civil service positions in the State of Massachusetts.31 In 
Feeney, as in Aeillo, everybody knew that the law would have a 
devastating effect on women, but women were prohibited from 
challenging the law under Equal Protection because they could not prove 
that lawmakers had a conscious intent to discriminate against them; they 
could not prove that the law was adopted for the purpose of imposing a 
burden upon them.32 
Another recent example of the Court’s blindness to the gender impact 
of its decisions is its ruling in Harris v. Quinn (2014),33 which overruled 
decades-old precedent in striking down fair share fees for a public union 
of home health care workers, and with it the viability of those workers to 
unionize. As Eileen Boris and Jennifer Klein state in their essay Reducing 
supporting nature of its insurance program.”). 
29. See Coleman v. Court of Appeals of Maryland, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 1346 (2012) (Ginsburg, J.,
dissenting). Justice Ginsburg stated: 
In sum, childbearing is not only a biological function unique to women. It  is also 
inextricably intertwined with employers’ “stereotypical views about women’s 
commitment to work and their value as employees.” Because pregnancy discrimination is 
inevitably sex discrimination, and because discrimination against women is t ightly 
interwoven with society’s beliefs about pregnancy and motherhood, I would hold that 
Aiello was egregiously wrong to declare that discrimination on the basis of pregnancy is 
not discrimination on the basis of sex. (citation omitted) 
30. Personnel Admin. v. Feeney, 422 U.S. 256, 281(1979) (upholding Massachusetts law 
granting absolute preference to veterans in civil service appointments). 
31. See id. at 271 n. 21 (“In 1972, women still constituted less than 2% of the enlisted 
strength.”); Id. at 265 (stating that Feeney “eventually concluded that further competition for civil 
service positions of interest to veterans would be futile.”). 
32. See id. at 279. The court stated: 
“Discriminatory purpose,” however, implies more than intent as volition or intent as 
awareness of consequences. It  implies that the decisionmaker, in this case a state 
legislature, selected or reaffirmed a particular course of action at least in part “because of,” 
not merely “in spite of,” its adverse effects upon an identifiable group. Yet, nothing in the 
record demonstrates that this preference for veterans was originally devised or 
subsequently re-enacted because it  would accomplish the collateral goal of keeping 
women in a stereotypic and predefined place in the Massachusetts Civil Service. 
33. Harris v. Quinn, 134 U.S. 2618, 2644 (2014) (striking down state law requiring home
health aides to pay fair-share fees to union that represented them in collective bargaining). 
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Labor to Love, “Harris v. Quinn shows as little respect for history as it 
does for women’s work.”34 
The reality, of course, is that there is a deeply entrenched 
unconscious bias that accepts double standards and fosters indifference to 
gender discrimination. In Aiello, the California legislature was indifferent 
to the impact of denying disability benefits to women who suffered 
complications from pregnancy, and in Feeney, the Massachusetts 
legislature was indifferent to the gender implications of granting an 
absolute preference to veterans in civil service employment. In both cases, 
the Supreme Court was indifferent to the evident and predictable 
disproportionate impact of these laws. The entire concept of 
“discriminatory intent” must be reexamined to account for unconscious 
bias. A liberal majority would certainly be more receptive to this 
argument. 
C. The “Real Differences” Test 
In his concurring opinion in Railway Express Agency v. New York, 
Justice Robert Jackson proposed an insightful standard for equal 
protection cases: the “real differences” test.35 Jackson suggested that the 
law may not treat groups of people differently unless there are “real 
differences” between them and other persons.36 Furthermore, to justify 
disparate treatment under the law, those differences must be “fairly related 
to the object of the legislation.”37 
During the modern Republican era, the Supreme Court repeatedly 
misapplied the “real differences” test in gender discrimination cases. For 
example, in Rostker v. Goldberg, the Court ruled that it was constitutional 
for the law to require men but not women to register for the draft because 
women were not legally eligible for combat,38 and in Michael M. v. 
Sonoma County Superior Court, the Court decided that it was 
constitutional to hold male but not female juveniles liable for statutory 
rape, because (the court found) the law was intended to prevent teen 
34. Eileen Boris, Jennifer Klein, Joel Rogers, Joshua Freeman, and Jane McAlvey, After 
‘Harris v. Quinn’: The State of Our Unions, The Nation (July 2, 2014), at 
https://www.thenation.com/article/after-harris-v-quinn-state-our-unions/.  
35. See Railway Express Agency v. N.Y., 336 U.S. 106, 112 (1949) (Jackson, J., concurring)
(stating, “I regard it  as a salutary doctrine that cities, states and the Federal Government must exercise 
their powers so as not to discriminate between their inhabitants except upon some reasonable 
differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation.”). 
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. See Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 83 (1981) (upholding provisions of Military
Selective Service Act requiring men, but not women, to register for the draft). 
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pregnancy and only women can become pregnant.39 
There is of course, no valid reason for the law to exempt women from 
the military draft. Nor is there a valid reason to hold them immune from 
prosecution for statutory rape. In Rostker, the difference between men and 
women – eligibility for combat – was not a “real difference”, but rather 
one that was imposed by federal statute and military regulation.40 In 
Michael M., the difference between men and women – the possibility of 
pregnancy – was not “fairly related to the object of the legislation,” which 
was to protect children from sexual contact.41 
Is it not remarkable that the same Court – with almost the same set 
of justices – could decide both Rostker and Feeney, Michael M. and 
Aeillo? In Rostker the Court was supremely aware that women were not 
eligible for combat, but that awareness disappeared in Feeney when 
veterans were awarded an absolute preference for government jobs. And 
in Michael M. the Court determined that the case turned on the fact that 
only women can become pregnant, but that signal fact was of no 
significance in Aiello. 
A more liberal court will overrule both Rostker and Michael M., and 
will rightfully acknowledge that the real differences between men and 
women are only seldom “fairly related” to the purposes of the law. 
III. LGBTQ RIGHTS
A. Marriage Equality 
The Supreme Court’s decisions in United States v. Windsor42 and 
39. See Michael M. v. Superior Ct. of Sonoma County, 450 U.S. 464, 476 (1981) (upholding 
state law punishing underage male, but not underage female, for engaging in sexual intercourse). 
40. See Rostker, supra note 38, at 76-77. The Court stated:
Women as a group, however, unlike men as a group, are not eligible for combat. The 
restrictions on the participation of women in combat in the Navy and Air Force are 
statutory. Under 10 U.S.C. § 6015, “women may not be assigned to duty on vessels or in 
aircraft that are engaged in combat missions,” and under 10 U.S.C. § 8549 female 
members of the Air Force “may not be assigned to duty in aircraft engaged in combat 
missions.” The Army and Marine Corps preclude the use of women in combat as a matter 
of established policy. Congress specifically recognized and endorsed the exclusion of 
women from combat in exempting women from registration. (citations omitted) 
41. See Michael M., supra note 39, at 471-472. The Court stated:
We need not be medical doctors to discern that young men and young women are not 
similarly situated with respect to the problems and the risks of sexual intercourse. Only 
women may become pregnant, and they suffer disproportionately the profound physical, 
emotional and psychological consequences of sexual activity. The statute at issue 
here protects women from sexual intercourse at an age when those consequences are 
particularly severe. (footnote omitted) 
42. Windsor, 133 S.Ct. at 2696 (striking down provision of federal Defense of Marriage Act
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Obergefell v. Hodges43 were each rendered by a 5-4 majority.44 The 
addition of two conservative justices would reverse those results. On the 
other hand, as noted above, the addition of a liberal justice might expand 
the reasoning of the Court. In Windsor and Obergefell, Justice Kennedy 
struck down the restrictive marriage laws on the ground that they failed to 
serve any legitimate governmental interest.45 In neither of the marriage 
cases does Justice Kennedy discuss whether sexual orientation is a suspect 
classification, or whether legislation directed against gays and lesbians is 
presumptively unconstitutional and subject to heightened scrutiny.46 
B. Sexual Freedom 
Lawrence v. Texas47 was authored by Justice Kennedy. In striking 
down a Texas law that made same-sex intercourse a crime, he reasoned 
that the law infringed upon the liberty rights of gays and lesbians.48 Unlike 
Justice Kennedy, in her concurring opinion in Lawrence Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor based her decision on Equal Protection, finding that it was 
unconstitutional for the law to permit opposite sex couples to engage in 
oral and anal sex but to punish same-sex couples for the same behavior.49 
However, Justice O’Conner, like Justice Kennedy in his later opinions in 
Windsor and Obergefell, declined to conduct a “suspect class” analysis; 
instead she reasoned that moral disapproval, without more, is an 
illegitimate basis for discriminating against a discrete group of people.50 
As in the marriage cases, the addition of a single liberal justice might 
enable the Court to find that gays and lesbians are a suspect class 
deserving of heightened judicial protection from hostile legislation. 
prohibiting the federal government from recognizing same-sex marriages). 
43. Obergefell, 135 S.Ct. 2584 (striking down state laws prohibiting same-sex marriage).
44. See id.
45. See Windsor, 133 S.Ct., at  2696 (stating, “The federal statute is invalid, for no legitimate
purpose overcomes the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its 
marriage laws, sought to protect in personhood and dignity.”); see also Obergefell, 135 S.Ct., at 2608 
(stating, “ there is no lawful basis for a State to refuse to recognize a lawful same-sex marriage 
performed in another State on the ground of its same-sex character”). 
46. See Windsor, 133 S.Ct. 2675; Obergefell, 135 S. Ct. 1039.
47. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 578 (2003) (striking down state law making same-sex 
intercourse a crime). 
48. Id at 562. (stating in the first  line of the opinion, “Liberty protects the person from
unwarranted government intrusions into a dwelling or other private places.”). 
49. Id. at 579 (O’Connor, J. concurring in the judgment) (stating, “Rather than relying on the
substantive component of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, as the Court does, I base 
my conclusion on the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.”) 
50. Id. at 583 (O’Connor, J., concurring in the judgment) (stating, “Moral disapproval of a
group cannot be a legitimate governmental interest under the Equal Protection Clause because legal 
classifications must not be “drawn for the purpose of disadvantaging the group burdened by the law.”). 
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Justice Scalia famously dissented in Lawrence51 and never retreated 
from his position that the government may make homosexuality a crime.52 
With the addition of two conservative justices the Supreme Court might 
adopt his position, overrule Lawrence, and authorize the states to once 
again criminalize same-sex intercourse. 
C. Distortion of the Political Process 
In Romer v. Evans,53 the Supreme Court struck down a state 
constitutional amendment that purported to strip the power from state and 
local governments to adopt laws that prohibited discrimination on the 
basis of sexual orientation.54 The Court reasoned that it was 
unconstitutional for the government to make it more difficult for one 
group of people to obtain the passage of protection from acts of 
discrimination than it is for other groups.55 In the wake of the Supreme 
Court decisions recognizing marriage equality, a number of states have 
enacted or proposed laws that would similarly prohibit governmental units 
from outlawing discrimination against gays, lesbians, and transgender 
persons.56 These laws distort the political process, just like the state 
constitutional amendment struck down in Romer. With two additional 
conservative justices, the Supreme Court might uphold these laws by 
overruling Romer or finding justification to distinguish it, as the Court did 
in Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action.57 
51. See id. at 586-605 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Id. at 594 (“Bowers was right”).
52. See Associated Press Salon, Scalia: It’s “effective” to draw parallels between murder and 
sodomy, (Dec. 11, 2012) (quoting Justice Scalia as stating, “If we cannot have moral feelings against 
homosexuality, can we have it  against murder?”), 
http://www.salon.com/2012/12/11/scalia_its_effective_to_draw_parallels_between_murder_and_so
domy/. (last accessed October 20, 2016). 
53. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 634 (1996) (striking down state constitutional amendment 
prohibiting the state or any of its agencies or subdivisions from adopting laws prohibiting 
discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation). 
54. Id.
55. See id. at 633 (stating, “A law declaring that in general it  shall be more difficult for one
group of citizens than for all others to seek aid from the government is itself a denial of equal 
protection of the laws in the most literal sense.”). 
56. See e.g. N.C. Public Facilities Privacy & Security Act, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, commonly 
known as House Bill 2 (“HB2”). This aspect of HB2 is discussed in the text accompanying notes 99-
101 infra. 
57. Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action, 134 Ct. 1623, 1638 (2014)
(distinguishing Romer and upholding state constitutional amendment prohibiting the state, state 
agencies, state universities, and political subdivisions from adopting race-conscious affirmative 
action programs). 
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IV. REPRODUCTIVE FREEDOM
A. Abortion 
Justice Kennedy has stood by the commitment that he, Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor, and Justice David Souter made in 1992 in Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey 58 when they 
reaffirmed Roe v. Wade59 and preserved a woman’s right to terminate a 
pregnancy. For example, in2016 in Whole Women’s Health v. 
Hellerstedt,60 Justice Kennedy voted with the four liberal justices to strike 
down the “admitting privileges” and “surgical center requirements” 
provisions of the Texas TRAP law.61 As with so many other constitutional 
issues, the replacement of Justice Scalia with a conservative justice would 
simply preserve the status quo. The addition of two conservative justices 
would likely be sufficient to overturn Roe v. Wade and all of the attendant 
rights. The addition of a liberal justice would likely result in expanded 
protection of the right to an abortion, principally because the Court might 
replace the “undue burden” test with “strict scrutiny.” 
Normally when a law “infringes” or “affects” a constitutional right, 
the Supreme Court presumes that the law is unconstitutional and applies 
strict scrutiny to determine its constitutionality.62 But when a law restricts 
a woman’s right to terminate a pregnancy, the Supreme Court evaluates 
its constitutionality by asking whether the law imposes an “undue burden” 
on the woman’s right.63 In applying the “undue burden” test, the Court 
has not presumed that the law is unconstitutional as it does with strict 
58. Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 846 (1992)
(reaffirming Roe v. Wade). 
59. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing the right of a woman to terminate a
pregnancy prior to viability). 
60. Whole Women’s Health v. Hellerstedt,136 S.Ct. 2292, 2300 (2016) (striking down
provisions of Texas law requiring abortion providers to have admitting privileges at a nearby hospitals 
and requiring abortion facilit ies to satisfy the standards of surgical centers). 
61. See id.
62. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut., 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
Justice Goldberg stated: 
In a long series of cases this Court has held that where fundamental personal liberties are 
involved, they may not be abridged by the States simply on a showing that a regulatory 
statute has some rational relationship to the effectuation of a proper state purpose. ‘Where 
there is a significant encroachment upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon 
showing a subordinating interest which is compelling,’ The law must be shown ‘necessary, 
and not merely rationally related to, the accomplishment of a permissible state policy.’ 
(citation omitted). 
63. See, e.g., Casey, 505 U.S., at  874 (stating, “Only where state regulation imposes an undue
burden on a woman’s ability to make this decision does the power of the State reach into the heart of 
the liberty protected by the Due Process Clause.”). 
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scrutiny. Instead, in effect, the persons challenging the law in effect bear 
the burden of proving that the law “unduly” inhibits a woman’s rights. 
The undue burden standard has been used to uphold numerous restrictions 
on the right to an abortion, including laws banning government funding 
of abortions,64 prohibiting abortion advice or referrals,65 imposing waiting 
periods,66 mandating patients to be subjected to “counseling” against 
abortions,67 and requiring parental consent.68 
Moreover the modern Republican Supreme Court has at times been 
reluctant to protect women from acts of private interference with 
reproductive freedom. While the Court has acknowledged that laws 
preserving access to clinics are “content neutral,”69 the Court has, as often 
as not, struck down these laws because they were not “narrowly tailored” 
enough.70 Most recently in McCullen v. Coakley,71 the Court unanimously 
struck down a statute requiring protesters to stay 35 feet away from 
reproductive clinic entrances. Sixteen years ago in Hill v. Colorado,72 the 
Court upheld a statute prohibiting protesters from approaching within 
eight feet of another person near a health care facility without that 
person’s consent.73 In his dissenting opinion in Hill, Justice Kennedy fired 
a shot across the bow, stating: 
The Court now strikes at the heart of the reasoned, careful balance I had 
believed was the basis for the opinion in Casey. 
*** 
So committed is the Court to its course that it denies these protesters, in 
the face of what they consider to be one of life’s gravest moral crises, 
even the opportunity to try to offer a fellow citizen a little pamphlet, a 
64. See, e.g., Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 499 (1977) (upholding Connecticut regulation 
prohibiting funding of abortions that were not medically necessary). 
65. See Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991) (upholding regulations prohibiting recipients of
funding under T itle X from abortion counseling and referrals). 




69. See, e.g., Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, 512 U.S. 753, 770 (1994) (finding injunction 
ordering protestors to stay 36 feet away from the clinic to be content neutral). 
70. See id. at 773 (upholding the 36-foot buffer zone but striking down other portions of the
injunction). 
71. McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, (2014) (striking down a statute requiring protesters 
to stay 35 feet away from clinic entrances). 
72. Hill v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 735 (2000) (upholding statute requiring clinic protesters to 
not approach within eight feet of persons entering the clinic). 
73. See id.
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handheld paper seeking to reach a higher law.74 
Justice Kennedy signaled in Hill that he might rescind his reaffirmance of 
Roe if the Court was unwilling to acknowledge what he considered to be 
the legal rights and moral prerogatives of abortion protestors. I believe 
that his message was heard in McCullen v. Coakley;75 none of the liberal 
justices dissented or even wrote a concurring opinion. The addition of a 
fifth liberal justice would strengthen the hand of those who wish to protect 
clinic patients and staff from obstruction and harassment. 
B. Contraception 
The entire modern understanding of the Right to Privacy may be at 
stake in this election. Like Justice Scalia, Justice Alito has never 
acknowledged the correctness of Griswold v. Connecticut or the central 
principle of the Right to Privacy. In Planned Parenthood v. Casey, the 
Court framed the Right to Privacy in these terms: 
Our law affords constitutional protection to personal decisions relating 
to marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, child 
rearing, and education. Our cases recognize “the right of 
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwarranted 
governmental intrusion into matters so fundamentally affecting a person 
as the decision whether to bear or beget a child.” Our precedents “have 
respected the private realm of family life which the state cannot 
enter.” These matters, involving the most intimate and personal choices 
a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and 
autonomy, are central to the liberty protected by the Fourteenth 
Amendment. At the heart of liberty is the right to define one’s own 
concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of 
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of 
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State.76 
The Court repeated and reaffirmed this statement of the Right to Privacy 
in Lawrence77 and Obergefell.78 Dissenting in Obergefell, Chief Justice 
Roberts took the position that the only unenumerated constitutional rights 
Americans possess are those that are rooted in tradition.79 Justice Alito 
74. Id. at 791-792.
75. McCullen, 134 S. Ct. 2518 (2014).
76. Casey, 505 U.S, at 851.
77. See Lawrence, 539 U.S., at  574 (quoting this passage from Casey).
78. See Obergefell, 135 S.Ct., at  2597 (stating, “ these liberties extend to certain personal
choices central to individual dignity and autonomy, including intimate choices that define personal 
identity and beliefs.”). 
79. See id., at  2616 (Roberts, C.J, dissenting) (stating, “The theory is that some liberties are
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gave the same reason for rejecting marriage equality in Windsor. 80 Justice 
Scalia had the same truncated vision of our fundamental rights.81 If a 
majority of like-minded conservative justices were appointed to the 
Supreme Court, they might reject the principle that the American people 
have a constitutional right to make intimate and personal choices 
regarding “marriage, procreation, contraception, family relationships, 
child rearing, and education” and opt instead for the “specific tradition” 
test favored by Justice Scalia; and they might find that the right to use 
contraception is not “deeply rooted in the nation’s tradition” and therefore 
not a constitutional right. 
V. THE VALIDITY AND INTERPRETATION OF “RELIGIOUS LIBERTY”
LEGISLATION 
A. Federal RFRA 
In Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc.,82 the Supreme Court 
construed the Federal Religious Freedom Restoration Act as invalidating 
a provision of the Affordable Care Act requiring employer-funded health 
insurance to cover all FDA-approved forms of birth control.83 In a 
decision of “startling breadth,”84 the majority of the Court expanded the 
concept of “religious liberty” beyond all previous bounds. Echoing its 
ruling in Citizens United that recognized the right of corporations to 
participate in the political process,85 in Hobby Lobby the Court for the first 
time declared that for-profit corporations have the capacity and the right 
“so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as fundamental,” and 
therefore cannot be deprived without compelling justification,” quoting Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 
U.S. 97, 105 (1934)). 
80. See Windsor, 133 S.Ct., at 2717 (Alito, J., dissenting) (stating, “What Windsor and the
United States seek . . . is not the protection of a deeply rooted right but the recognition of a very new 
right.”). 
81. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 127 fn. 6 (Scalia, J.) (writing for three members 
of the Court and contending that fundamental rights must be based upon “specific traditions” 
“continuing to the present day”). 
82. Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores Inc. 134 S.Ct. 2751, 2777 (2014).
83. See id.
84. Id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating, “In a decision of startling breadth, the Court 
holds that commercial enterprises, including corporations, along with partnerships and sole 
proprietorships, can opt out of any law (saving only tax laws) they judge incompatible with their 
sincerely held religious beliefs.”). 
85. Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, 558 U.S. 310, (2010) (ruling that
corporations have a constitutional right to spend money to support candidates for public office; id. at 
354 (stating, “By suppressing the speech of manifold corporations, both for-profit and nonprofit, the 
Government prevents their voices and viewpoints from reaching the public and advising voters on 
which persons or entities are hostile to their interests.”). 
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to exercise religion.86 In an even more extreme and unprecedented ruling, 
for the first time in its history the Supreme Court declared that in 
exercising religion, one person has the right to deprive another person of 
their legal rights.87 
Justice Ginsburg’s powerful dissent in Hobby Lobby rejects these 
and the other constitutional innovations of Justice Alito’s majority 
opinion.88 With the addition of one additional liberal justice, her 
dissenting opinion will become the majority. 
B. State RFRA’s 
In the wake of the Court’s rulings in Windsor and Obergefell, several 
states have enacted or considered enacting legislation permitting 
discrimination against LGBTQ individuals and couples. For example, 
Mississippi H.B. 1523 authorizes both private persons and government 
employees to act upon three specific religious beliefs involving gender, 
marriage, and sexual conduct,89 while North Carolina H.B. 2 mandates 
discrimination against transgender persons.90 
86. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct., at 2769-2770 (majority extends religious exercise rights under
RFRA to for-profit corporations). Nor had the Supreme Court previously permitted persons engaged 
in commercial activities to disregard laws they had religious objections to. For example, in United 
States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982), the Court stated: 
Congress and the courts have been sensitive to the needs flowing from the Free Exercise 
Clause, but every person cannot be shielded from all the burdens incident to exercising 
every aspect of the right to practice religious beliefs. When followers of a particular sect 
enter into commercial activity as a matter of choice, the limits they accept on their own 
conduct as a matter of conscience and faith are not to be superimposed on the statutory 
schemes, which are binding on others in that activity. Granting an exemption from social 
security taxes to an employer operates to impose the employer’s religious faith on the 
employees. 
87. Hobby Lobby at 2790-2791 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg stated: 
The exemption sought by Hobby Lobby and Conestoga would override significant 
interests of the corporations’ employees and covered dependents. It would deny legions of 
women who do not hold their employers’ beliefs access to contraceptive coverage that the 
ACA would otherwise secure. See Catholic Charities of Sacramento, Inc. v. Superior 
Court, 32 Cal.4th 527, 565 (2004) (“We are unaware of any decision in which . . . [the U.S. 
Supreme Court] has exempted a religious objector from the operation of a neutral, 
generally applicable law despite the recognition that the requested exemption would 
detrimentally affect the rights of third parties.”). In sum, with respect to free exercise 
claims no less than free speech claims, “ ‘[y]our right to swing your arms ends just where 
the other man’s nose begins.’ “ Chafee, Freedom of Speech in War Time, 32 Harv. L. Rev. 
932, 957 (1919). 
88. See id. at 2787 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating, “The Court does not pretend that the First 
Amendment’s Free Exercise Clause demands religion-based accommodations so extreme, for our 
decisions leave no doubt on that score.”). 
89. Miss. Laws 2016, H.R. 1523 § 2 (eff. July 1, 2016).
90. N.C. Public Facilit ies Privacy & Security Act, 2016 N.C. Sess. Laws 3, commonly known
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In evaluating the constitutionality of these and similar laws, the 
Court must not only revisit its ruling in Hobby Lobby and determine the 
level of scrutiny these laws deserve under Equal Protection, but the Court 
will also have to revisit its recent interpretations of the Establishment 
Clause and the State Action Doctrine. Does the government have an 
obligation under the Constitution to remain neutral in religious matters? 
Is the government prohibited from encouraging acts of discrimination? 
For example, Mississippi H.B. 1523 authorizes persons to refuse 
service to others based upon their beliefs that marriage is limited to a man 
and a woman and that sex should be confined to marriage.91 In Barber v. 
Bryant,92 the district court ruled that this law violates the Establishment 
Clause because it violates the principle that the government must remain 
neutral in matters of religion.93 However, in 2014 in Greece v. 
Galloway,94 the Supreme Court abandoned the notion that the government 
is prohibited from endorsing religion, and noticeably failed to mention the 
longstanding principle that government must be neutral towards 
religion.95 Will the Supreme Court affirm the district court’s decision in 
Barber or will it hold that the government may endorse specific religious 
beliefs, not only by permitting religious displays and official prayers, but 
by permitting persons to discriminate on the basis of those beliefs? 
Similarly, North Carolina H.B. 2 prohibits individuals from using 
any bathroom in a public facility except for bathrooms designated for use 
by that person’s biological sex at birth.96 In other words, a transgender 
person must use a public bathroom for the sex they were born with, not 
the sex they have become. Does this provision of the law constitute gender 
discrimination? The district court in Carcano v. McCrory97 ruled that the 
as House Bill 2 (“HB2”). 
91. See Miss. Laws 2016, H.R. 1523 § 2 (eff. July 1, 2016).
92. Barber v. Bryant, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 86120 at 75, (833 F.3d 510, 2016) (striking down
Mississippi H.B. 1523 under Establishment Clause and Equal Protection Clause). 
93. Id. at *4 (stating, “HB 1523 grants special rights to citizens who hold one of three
“sincerely held religious beliefs or moral convictions” reflecting disapproval of lesbian, gay, 
transgender, and unmarried persons. Miss. Laws 2016, H.R. 1523 § 2 (eff. July 1, 2016). That violates 
both the guarantee of religious neutrality and the promise of equal protection of the laws.”). 
94. Town of Greece v. Galloway, 134 S.Ct. 1811 (2014) (upholding town board’s practice of
opening monthly meetings with a prayer delivered by invited clergy). 
95. See id. at 1821 (abrogating Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh A.C.L.U., 492 U.S.
573 (1989) and abandoning the “no endorsement” test for Establishment Clause cases). 
96. See H.B. 2, Part I, which provides in part:
Local boards of education shall require every multiple occupancy bathroom or changing 
facility that is designated for student use to be designated for and used only by students 
based on their biological sex. 
97. Carcano v. McCrory, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 114605 at *97 (315 F.R.D. 176, 2016),
(striking down “bathroom bill” portion of law under T itle IX). 
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provision of the statute governing access to public bathrooms and locker 
rooms constitutes gender discrimination under both Title IX and the Equal 
Protection Clause; however, while the Court found that H.B. 2 violates 
Title IX, it also ruled that the law does not violate the Equal Protection 
Clause.98 
H.B. 2 also prohibits political subdivisions from outlawing 
discrimination on the basis of gender identity.99 Is this “state action” in 
violation of Equal Protection? Is the State of North Carolina encouraging 
acts of private discrimination in violation of the Hunter v. Erickson line 
of cases?100 In Schuette v. Coalition to Defend Affirmative Action,101 the 
Supreme Court retreated from one aspect of its Hunter precedent in 
upholding a Michigan constitutional amendment that prohibited 
governmental entities from adopting affirmative action programs.102 As 
noted earlier, a more conservative Supreme Court might completely 
eviscerate the constitutional prohibition against distortion of the political 
process.103 
VI. CONGRESS’ POWER TO ENACT CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
A. Congress’ power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment 
In Boerne v. Flores,104 the Supreme Court imposed a substantial 
restriction on Congress’ power to enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth 
98. See id.
99. See H.B. 2, Part III, Protection of Rights in Employment and Public Accommodations,
which states: 
The General Assembly declares that the regulation of discriminatory practices in 
employment is properly an issue of general, statewide concern, such that this Article and 
other applicable provisions of the General Statutes supersede and preempt any ordinance, 
regulation, resolution, or policy adopted or imposed by a unit of local government or other 
political subdivision of the State that regulates or imposes any requirement upon an 
employer pertaining to the regulation of discriminatory practices in employment, except 
such regulations applicable to personnel employed by that body that are not otherwise in 
conflict with State law. 
 100.  See Reitman v. Mulkey, 387 U.S. 369, 381 (1967), (striking down state constitutional 
amendment that sought to protect the right of individuals to decline to sell or rent real property to any 
person in their absolute discretion significantly involved the state in acts of private discrimination); 
Hunter v. Erickson, 393 U.S. 385, 391 (1969) (striking down amendment to city charter that required 
a referendum before city council could enact a fair housing ordinance). 
 101.  Schuette,134 S.Ct. at 1638 (2014) (upholding state constitutional amendment prohibiting 
the state or political subdivisions from adopting race-conscious affirmative action programs). 
102.  See id. 
 103.  See notes 53-57 supra and accompanying text for a discussion of the concept of “distortion 
of the political process.” 
104.  Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 536 (1997) (striking down federal Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act as applied to state laws). 
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Amendment.105 In that case, the Court ruled that while Congress may 
enact laws protecting civil rights, it may not go too far; instead, those 
protective laws must be “congruent with” and “proportionate to” the 
Court’s interpretation of people’s rights under Section 1 of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.106 A more liberal court would probably reject the 
“congruence and proportionality” standard of Boerne v. Flores, as Justice 
Ginsburg recently suggested in her dissent in Coleman v. Maryland Court 
of Appeals. 107 In that case, the Court might then return to the salutary 
doctrine that Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment authorizes Congress 
to enact laws that it has a rational basis for believing are “necessary and 
proper” for the protection of civil rights.108 
B. Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause 
Article I, Section 8, Clause 3 of the Constitution grants Congress the 
power to enact laws regulating interstate commerce, and under the 
Affectation Doctrine, the Commerce Clause has long been interpreted to 
mean that Congress has the power to enact laws regulating economic 
activity that, in the aggregate, substantially affects interstate commerce.109 
Many of this nation’s most significant civil rights laws have been adopted 
and upheld pursuant to this power.110 In recent years, the Supreme Court 
has narrowly construed Congress’ power under the Commerce Clause by 
adopting a constricted understanding of what constitutes “economic 
activity.”111 The Court has struck down laws regulating conduct that 
105.  See id. 
 106.  Id. at 533 (stating, “The stringent test RFRA demands of state laws reflects a lack of 
proportionality or congruence between the means adopted and the legitimate end to be achieved.”). 
 107.  See Coleman v. Maryland Court of Appeals, 132 S.Ct. 1327, 1334 (2012) (striking down 
“self-care” provision of Family Medical Leave Act to the extent that it allowed recovery of money 
damages against the state); id. at fn. 1 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Justice Ginsburg stated: 
I remain of the view that Congress can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its 
Article I Commerce Clause power. See Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 
100 (1996) (Souter, J., dissenting). Beyond debate, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(D) is valid 
Commerce Clause legislation. I also share the view that Congress can abrogate state 
immunity pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment where Congress could reasonably 
conclude that legislation “constitutes an appropriate way to enforce [a] basic equal 
protection requirement.” Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 
356, 377 (2001) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
108.  See id. 
 109.  See, e.g. Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 17 (2005) (stating, “Congress has the power to 
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce.”). 
110.  See, e.g., Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 261-62 (1964) 
(upholding public accommodations provision of 1964 Civil Rights Act as validly enacted pursuant to 
the Commerce Clause). 
111.  See Lopez v. United States, 514 U.S. 549, 561 (1995) (striking down provision of federal 
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unambiguously has a substantial effect on interstate commerce on the 
ground that the conduct being regulated did not constitute “economic 
activity.”112 A more liberal court would reject this constricted approach, 
and would, of course, reject Justice Thomas’s proposal to overrule the 
Affectation Doctrine in its entirety.113 
C. The State Sovereignty Doctrine 
Less than twenty years ago, the Supreme Court revived the long-
discredited doctrine of “state sovereignty,”114 a concept that was a 
foundation principle of the Articles of Confederation,115 but which was 
prominently omitted from the Constitution of the United States, which 
ordained and established “a more perfect union.”116 In Shelby County v. 
Holder117 this unenumerated principle of “state sovereignty” was invoked 
to invalidate a key enforcement provision of the Voting Rights Act,118 and 
in Coleman v. Maryland it was used to strike down a provision of the 
Family Medical Leave Act.119 Justice Ginsburg dissented in Shelby 
County and Coleman, and she made clear in those cases that the principle 
of “state sovereignty” may not be used to overcome the will of the people, 
as represented in Congress, in the adoption of civil rights legislation. 120 
With the addition of one additional liberal justice, her position will 
become the law of the land. 
Guns Free School Zone Act on the ground that possession of a firearm is not “economic activity”); 
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (striking down civil suit  provision of Violence 
Against Women Act on the ground that acts of sexual assault are not “economic activity); NFIB v. 
Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2591 (2012) (ruling that individual mandate of Affordable Care Act did not 
regulate “economic activity”). 
112.  Id. 
 113.  See, e.g., Raich, 545 U.S., at  44-45 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (rejecting Affectation 
Doctrine). 
114.  See Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 716 (1999) (reviving the concept of state sovereign 
immunity and citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
 115.  See Art. of Conf., Art. II (providing, “Each state retains its sovereignty, freedom, and 
independence, and every Power, Jurisdiction, and right, which is not by this confederation expressly 
delegated to the United States, in Congress assembled.”). 
116.  U.S. Const., pmbl. 
 117.  Shelby County v. Holder, 133 S.Ct. 2612, 2631 (2013) (striking down preclearance 
provision of federal Voting Rights Act as violating the “equal sovereignty” of the states). 
118.  See id. at 2623 (stating, “Not only do States retain sovereignty under the Constitution, there 
is also a “fundamental principle of equal sovereignty” among the States.”). 
 119.  Coleman, 132 S.Ct., at 1333 (stating, “A foundational premise of the federal system is that 
States, as sovereigns, are immune from suits for damages, save as they elect to waive that defense.”). 
 120.  See Holder, 133 S.Ct., at 2648-2650 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (explaining that the doctrine 
of “equal sovereignty” has no application outside the domain of the admission of new states); 
Coleman, 132 S.Ct., at  1339 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating, “I remain of the view that Congress 
can abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant to its Article I Commerce Clause power.”). 
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VII. INTERPRETATION OF CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
A. The Canon of Constitutional Avoidance 
Judicial respect for the legislative branch requires that if a statute is 
ambiguous, and one interpretation of the statute would be constitutional 
and the other interpretation of the statute would be unconstitutional, then 
the court is bound to adopt the interpretation that is constitutional so that 
it may uphold the legislative act.121 The modern Republican Supreme 
Court takes the canon of “constitutional avoidance” one step further. The 
conservative court has chosen to narrowly interpret civil rights laws such 
as Title VII and the Voting Rights Act in order to avoid deciding whether 
those provisions are constitutional.122 Essentially, if the Court harbors a 
constricted understanding of a congressional power or a constitutional 
right, it will translate that understanding into a narrow construction of civil 
rights statutes. A liberal majority with a broader understanding of 
congressional power and individual rights would be less likely to find that 
civil rights statutes were going too far in protecting the rights of 
individuals. 
B. The Use of Legislative History 
Justice Scalia abhorred legislative history, and refused to consider 
legislative reports or debates in construing the meaning of legislation. 123 
This left Justice Scalia free to interpret the words of a statute 
unencumbered by evidence of what its authors meant to accomplish.124 
 121.  See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S.Ct. 2566, 2593 (2012) (quoting Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes in Blodgett v. Holden, 275 U.S. 142, 148 (1927): “ [T]he rule is settled that as between two 
possible interpretations of a statute, by one of which it  would be unconstitutional and by the other 
valid, our plain duty is to adopt that which will save the Act.”). 
 122.  See, e.g., Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 563 (2009) (interpreting Title VII to mean that 
before an employer can voluntarily adopt a race-conscious affirmative action program it  must have a 
strong basis in evidence to believe it  will be subject to liability if it fails to take race-conscious action, 
congruent with the interpretation of cases under the Equal Protection Clause); Id. at 582 (“Our cases 
discussing constitutional principles can provide helpful guidance in this statutory context.”); 
Northwest Austin Municipal Utility District No. One v. Holder, 557 U.S. 193, 211 (2009) 
(interpreting the Voting Rights Act to permit all political units within a state to apply for a “bailout” 
from the preclearance provisions of the Voting Rights Act, in light of concerns about the 
constitutionality of the VRA).  
 123.  See, e.g., Graham County Soil and Water Conservation Dist. V. U.S. ex rel. Wilson, 559 
U.S. 280, 302 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part  and dissenting in part) (stating, “ it is utterly 
impossible to discern what the Members of Congress intended except to the extent that intent is 
manifested in the only remnant of ‘history’ that bears the unanimous endorsement of the majority in 
each House: the text of the enrolled bill that became law.”).  
124.  See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts 
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Similarly, when Justice Alito interpreted the meaning of the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act in Hobby Lobby, he did obvious violence to the 
clear bipartisan purpose of Congress to “restore” the pre-Smith meaning 
and effect of the Free Exercise Clause.125 As Justice Ginsburg noted in her 
dissenting opinion in Shelby County, “The Court makes no genuine 
attempt to engage with the massive legislative record that Congress 
assembled.”126 Additional conservative justices are likely to follow the 
lead of Justices Scalia and Alito, while a liberal justice is likely to give 
due regard to the importance of legislative history in statutory 
interpretation, and to be more faithful to congressional intent. 
C. Using Bad Constitutional Law to Interpret Statutes Badly 
In his dissenting opinion in Young v. United Parcel Service,127 
Justice Scalia invoked Geduldig v. Aiello to justify a narrow interpretation 
of the Pregnancy Discrimination Act.128 If like-minded justices are 
appointed to the Supreme Court, the Court would construe this and similar 
statutes in accordance with their narrow understanding of what constitutes 
equal treatment of women and men. A liberal justice, in contrast, would 
reject cases like Aiello as shedding light on the true meaning of civil rights 
statutes. 
VIII. SUMMARY
Myriad provisions of Constitutional Law bear upon gender equality. 
Standards under the Equal Protection Clause, the Right to Privacy, the 
First Amendment, the Establishment Clause, the Free Exercise Clause, the 
Commerce Clause, the Enforcement Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, the State Action Doctrine, and the unenumerated principle 
of State Sovereignty all bear upon the legal rights of women and men, 
16-17 (2012) (contending that in statutory interpretation the role of judges is to determine the meaning 
of the words of the statute, not to determine the meaning ascribed to those words by the members of 
the legislature); see also Rachel Kenigsberg, Convenient Textualism: Justice Scalia’s Legacy in 
Environmental Law, 17 VT. J. ENVTL. L. 418 (2016) (contending that Justice Scalia abandoned 
textualism in order to narrowly construe environmental legislation). 
 125.  See Hobby Lobby, 134 S.Ct., at 2796 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (stating, “Had Congress 
intended RFRA to initiate a change so huge, a clarion statement to that effect likely would have been 
made in the legislation. See Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc., 531 U.S. 457, 468 
(2001) (Congress does not ‘hide elephants in mouseholes’)). 
126.  Holder, 133 S.Ct., at  2644 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 127.  Young v. United Parcel Service, 135 S.Ct. 1338, 1343 (2015) (construing the federal 
Pregnancy Discrimination Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k)). 
128.  Id. at 1363 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (invoking Aiello for the proposition that the language of 
the Pregnancy Discrimination Act serves merely a clarifying function). 
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LGBTQ and straight individuals. The Supreme Court is evenly and 
sharply divided in its approach to interpreting all of these constitutional 
provisions, and these interpretive differences also affect the validity and 
application of civil rights statutes. The recent presidential election will 
have a major impact on our legal rights to gender equality. 
